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Innovation is the building block of competitive advantages and thus economic policies are 
increasingly focused on creating stimulus to increase a country’s innovative performance and 
growth potential, namely through knowledge accumulation in general and R&D in particular. 
In this context, current policy trend seems to support the strengthening of Intellectual Property 
Rights  (IPR),  in particular, patent protection,  with  the  argument  that positive  effects  will 
emerge and would be extensive to all countries regardless their level of development. In this 
paper  we  question  this  “one  size  fits  all”  policy  and  assess  how  patent  thicket  affects 
knowledge productive investment taking into account countries’ development levels. Based 
on a panel of 95 countries over a ten-year period (1997-2006), our results show that patents 
have asymmetric impacts across countries development stages, evidencing pervious effects on 
technological  leaders  and  positive  ones  on  some  laggards.  Such  evidence  sustains  that 
innovation policies be adjusted to countries development stages.  
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Innovation is the engine of economic growth and investment in R&D is its main input hence 
being the driving force of economic growth (Baudry and Dumont, 2006). Given this, policies 
aiming to promote economic development and growth are focussed nowadays on improving 
human capital and creating mechanisms to support innovation and stimulate R&D investment 
(Encaoua et al., 2006). One of the main policy instruments to increase the incentives to R&D, 
in particular, its expected return, is the intellectual property protection system. The insight 
provided by Romer’s (1990) seminal work highlights knowledge’s public good nature leading 
to  the  under  rewarding  of  R&D  investments  due  to  its  foreseeable  spillovers  and 
appropriability difficulties. The system of intellectual property rights aims at tackling the non-
excludability characteristic of knowledge production function. The unrewarded social gains 
resulting  from  spillovers  would justify public  intervention  (e.g.  subsidizing  or  conducting 
public R&D).  
Today’s political tendency seems to be supportive of the strengthening of patent/IPR laws and 
enforcement under the argument of avoiding trade distortions and fostering innovation in the 
technological frontier, which through faster and more safe licensing and ordered diffusion, 
would also benefit catching-up and laggard countries (Maskus, 2000). Hence, some countries 
like  the  United  States,  backed  by  the  World  Trade  Organization,  strongly  uphold  the 
extension of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreements (TRIP). Nonetheless, like 
in  Laffer’s  curve  for  the  optimal  tax  rate,  manipulating  patent  coverage  and  range  of 
protection is not without its perks and trade-offs and the configuration of a global patent/IPR 
system must weigh different opposing dynamics that might influence R&D investment.  
When patent rights granted are weak, the rents appropriable in the future from an innovation 
are  minor  and  thus  R&D  investment  may  be  under-supplied  (Sakakibara  and  Branstetter, 
2001; Varsakelis, 2001). The sub-optimal rewarding leads to sub-optimal R&D investment, 
sub-optimal  technological  progress  rate,  and  consequently,  results  in  a  smaller  economic 
growth rate. Shapiro (2001), Schneider (2005), Chen and Puttitanun (2005), and Hunt (2006), 
however,  have  conceptually  challenged  this  linear  view,  arguing  that  excessive  patent 
protection  in  rapidly  innovating,  strongly  cumulative  and  path  dependent  industries  may 
negatively impact on the returns to R&D investment and hence have a negative dynamic 
effect  on  economic  growth.  The  first  perspective  is  predominant  (Almeida  and  Teixeira, 
2007) whereas the latter is still scarcely explored.   
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In fact, not only it is a still barely addressed subject but most of the analyses on this subject 
neglect  an  economic  development  perspective.  The  academic  absence  of  an  economic 
development  perspective  is  paired  with  the  current  design  of  Trade  Related  Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreements (TRIP) that aims to enforce and extend a common patent system 
regardless of countries’ stages of development. Additionally, the few papers that undertake an 
economic development perspective concentrate on developing and least developed countries, 
almost ignoring the technological leaders.  
The  assessment  of  potential  asymmetries  in  terms  of  stimulus  to  R&D  simultaneously 
controlling for different levels of development and structural characteristics of countries is a 
gap  that  we  aim  to  contribute  to  fill  in.  Thus,  our  goal  in  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to 
empirically assess the potential for asymmetric impacts of the patent accumulation on R&D 
investment  involving  countries  at  different  levels  of  development,  allowing  to  evaluate 
whetherf there are reasons to differentiate patent systems among countries by creating a more 
complex but tailored patent system or whether, in the case we find only small asymmetric 
effects between patents and R&D, the simplest and common policy framework of “one size 
fits all” stands as suitable.  
This paper is organized as follows. After introduction, in Section 2 we review the literature on 
economic development that analyses issues related with Patent and/or R&D. In Section 3, we 
devise our theoretical and econometric model, present the proxies for the variables used and 
provide a synthetic overview on the panel data estimation techniques. In Section 4, the results 
are presented and analyzed. Finally, we conclude this paper with some final notes and policy 
recommendations.  
2. Economic Development, Patents and R&D: a literature review  
Knowledge is recognized as the corner stone of productivity and ultimately, of economic 
growth (Encaoua et al., 2006). R&D aims at producing more knowledge and has become the 
driving force of economic growth being nowadays central in economic policy and a crucial 
factor for the economic development of countries (Maskus, 2000).  
Economic policy is increasingly focussing on fostering R&D, promoting its efficiency and the 
capitalization of spillovers, ultimately enhancing its economic impact through innovation and 
diffusion.  Notwithstanding  the  R&D/Patent  importance,  the  vast  literature  on  economic 
development has paid little attention to the subject (Maskus, 2000), lacking to assess the  
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combination  of  patent-R&D  relationship,  and  thus  neglecting  the  potential  asymmetry  of 
effects across different economic development stages. 
Table 1 provides a synthesis of economic development literature that focuses R&D and/or 
patents related topics and which, for the sake of organization, we grouped into the following 
categories:  agricultural  R&D;  redirection  of  R&D;  building  technological  capabilities, 
catching-up opportunities and technological transfer; science linkages; R&D - Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI); R&D/IPR/economic development; and technological policy. 
The set of papers grouped under ‘Agricultural R&D’ have in common the goal to assess how 
agriculture R&D could lead to an increase in productivity and lowering of food prices in 
underdeveloped  countries,  linking  occasionally  to  patents  when  trying  to  understand  how 
developed countries’ R&D could be redirected to tropical agriculture specificities. Beintema 
et al.’s (1997) study presents a descriptive analysis of the evolution of R&D investment and 
number of R&D researchers, comparing the national agriculture systems in 21 sub-Saharan 
countries. Their conclusions point to an increase in the number of researchers however, not 
matched  by  R&D  expenditures.  Also  Alston  et  al.  (1998)  perform  a  very  comprehensive 
(comprising 153 countries) descriptive analysis  on public policies supporting R&D. Their 
results  corroborate  Beintema  et  al.’s  (1997)  findings,  concluding  that  Least  Developed 
Countries (LDC) are still not investing enough and arguing that there are efficiency gains to 
be achieved from devising decentralised schemes of public financing rather than the common 
centralized coordination. The paper of Kremer and Zwane (2005) discusses the importance of 
implementing  rewarding  mechanisms  that  stimulated  MNEs  (Multinational  Enterprises)  to 
redirect  their  R&D’s  investment  towards  tropical  agriculture.  Though  Kremer  and  Zwane 
(2005) do not focussed on patent systems as one possible instrument, their study reveals that 
technology push programs have resulted in low adoption rates whereas pull programs seem to 
have conducted to better results. German and Stroud’s (2007) paper evaluates the integration 
of different learning processes, from formal R&D, empirical research and action research, to 
enhance knowledge building.   
The  redirection  of  North  R&D  to  South  needs  is  explicitly  addressed  by  Lanjouw  and 
Cockburn (2001).
1 Their empirical analysis of pharmaceutical MNEs finds no evidence of a 
patent stimulus effect on the redirection of pharmaceutical R&D to tropical diseases as a 
consequence of TRIP’s increasing South coverage.  
                                                 
1 North and South stand here as metaphor for, respectively, developed and developing/less developed countries.  
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A second group of studies analyses R&D in its role in ‘knowledge building’, bearing the vast 
majority  of  the  studies  an  empirical  microeconomic  focus.  Hobday  (1995)  analyses  how 
electronic firms in Southeast Asia have overcome entry barriers and lack of capabilities and 
how they managed their learning from simple manufacturing to leaders, highlighting the key 
role played by  imitation  and  reverse  engineering  in  the  accumulation  of  capabilities.  Lee 
(1995)  estimates  the  relationship  between  technology  imports  and  R&D  in  Korean  firms 
reinforcing  Hobday’s  argument  of  technology  transfer  and  imitation  as  key  elements  to 
technological capabilities accumulation. In the same line of reasoning, Choung et al. (2000) 
stresses the importance of initial OEM manufacturing, rather than R&D, to the deepening of 
capabilities and production skills. In fact, this group of papers highlights that R&D becomes a 
major input to capabilities building only upon firms’ achievement of a minimum threshold 
level. However, in an attempt to asses the relevance of this threshold in terms of technology 
absorptive  capacity,  Katrak  (1997)  observes  that  importing  technology  actually  stimulates 
R&D expenditures unlike what would be expected from the predominance of a substitution 
effect between technology import and R&D on initial technological levels. Vishwasrao and 
Bosshardt’s (2001) results corroborate Katrak’s, indicating a positive effect of technology 
imports on R&D investments. Niosi and Reid (2007) question the real opportunities to catch 
up presented by biotechnology or nanotechnology. According to them, these technologies 
given the demanding scale of financial and human resources for their development are only 
viable for the largest LDCs. Hence, the structural conditions might limit the potential of some 
technologies being developed at initial stages of development. 
The  distinction  between  embodied  and  disembodied  technology  raises  the  importance  of 
introducing  patent  systems  in  order  to  promote  a  more  efficient  and  complete  diffusion. 
Disembodied or tacit technology is a barrier to imitation and learning, limiting the degree of 
technology  transfer  (Arora,  1996).  Arora’s  (1996)  empirical  study  comprising  144  Indian 
firms analyzes the importance of patents to the protection of leaders and the promotion of 
disembodied technology transfer. The econometric results support the argument of a positive 
relationship between IPR and the bundling of disembodied with embodied capital. Addressing 
technology transfer in a different perspective, Montobbio and Rampa (2005) conclude that 
developing countries tend to concentrate innovative activities in lower technological intensity 
industries, which are stagnating worldwide, creating therefore inertia to a structural evolution 
towards a more knowledge intensive structural specialization.  
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Innovation is increasingly understood as the result of a systemic process, combining Science 
Push and Demand Pull’s perspectives and focussing on the efficiency of R&D. Here, a key 
role  is  devoted  to  networking,  in  particular  ‘science  linkages’,  which  can  increase  the 
economic  return  of  public  investment  on  human  capital  and  also  enhance  firms’ 
competitiveness  and  innovative  performance,  implying  the  bridging  between  the  different 
sectors  of  an  economy:  firms,  universities,  government  and  nonprofits  R&D  institutions. 
Patent systems can provide the framework to regulate such relations, increasing the protection 
of  each  agent’s  interest,  hence  removing  barriers  to  collaboration.  Kodama  and  Suzuki’s 
(2007)  paper  evaluates  the  significance  of  establishing  effective  science  linkages  and 
developing  firm  capabilities  to  make  technology  transfer  viable.  Describing  the  receiver-
active Japanese paradigm, Kodama and Suzuki (2007) highlights the proactive role of firms in 
linking  to  universities.  Analyzing  science  linkages,  Mathews  and  Hu  (2007)  study  the 
Taiwanese  which  presents  a  different  model  centred  on  university  research.  In  Taiwan, 
patents have become the cornerstone of the technological market, being freely acquired from 
Universities by firms. This creates a signalling mechanism to the direction of public R&D, 
based on the direct commercialization of technologies in a market framework regulated by a 
patent/IPR system. Basant and Chandra (2007) presents a distinctive perspective on science 
linkages, focussing on their importance for cluster development in Bangalore, India, where 
the authors argue in favour of the need of Universities and Industry to co-evolve to maximize 
the cluster’s performance and simultaneously providing a different funding alternative for 
Universities. 
The patent system – R&D relationship is the focus of the economic development literature 
that addresses the attraction and importance of FDI in knowledge building and as a channel 
for  embodied  and  disembodied  technology  transfer.  Focusing  on  assessing  which  are  the 
determinants  of  FDI  R&D  location,  Kumar’s  (1996)  results  indicate  that  MNEs  mostly 
externalize R&D of an adaptive type aimed at assisting market penetration in local and nearby 
markets  being  creative  R&D  kept  in  home  countries.  Hence,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
sensitivity of FDI R&D to IPR is not significant, even in industries particularly sensitive to 
IPR (Kumar, 1996). Reddy’s (1997) conclusions, in the line of what Kumar (1996) states, 
point to local human capital as a “sine qua non” condition to attract FDI R&D. Glass and 
Saggi (1998) argue that the quality of FDI is dependent upon the rates of innovation and 
imitation where, given the need to accumulate a minimum threshold of capabilities, imitation 
can actually contribute to attracting quality FDI through its learning role. FDI seems to be  
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much  more  responsive  to  cost  differentials  than  to  patent’s  protection  (Glass  and  Saggi, 
1998). 
Finally, there is another set of articles (e.g., Helpman, 1993; Lai, 1998; Parello, 2008) that 
combine economic development, patent/IPR, and R&D, where the effectiveness of patent/IPR 
systems in stimulating innovation is addressed, arising also some discussion over the potential 
asymmetries of effects across different levels of economic development.  
The  debate  regarding  the  adequacy  of  extending  and  strengthening  patent/IPR  protection 
worldwide is theoretically little explored (Helpman, 1993) and empirical demonstrations are 
even scarcer (Helpman, 1993, Maskus, 2000). Indeed, Helpman’s (1993) paper constitutes 
one  of  the  exceptions  where  stages  of  development  are  taken  into  consideration  when 
analyzing the effects of patent/IPR systems on R&D. Helpman (1993) analyzes the effects of 
extending  TRIP  over  terms  of  trade,  interregional  allocation  of  manufacturing,  product 
availability  and  R&D  investment  patterns  and  across  developed  (North)  and  developing 
countries (South). By assessing the net benefits accruing to North and South from reinforcing 
IPRs  in  the  South,  Helpman  concludes  that  if  there  are  benefits  from  TRIP  worldwide 
extension, there are not certainly for South. In spite of Helpman’s (1993) analysis considers 
both developed and developing countries, it is clearly focussed on the South pointing to a 
negative impact on the South and an unclear net effect on the North. Likewise, Lai (1998) 
compares  the  effects  of  strengthening  IPR  in  the  South  according  to  different  possible 
channels  for  technology  transfer.  From  a  theoretical  standpoint,  Lai  (1998)  argues  that 
stronger IPR in the South will foster North innovation whenever FDI is the main technology 
transfer channel and will have a negative effect when imitation is more relevant. Providing an 
empirical analysis, Gould and Gruben (1996) assess, for a sample of 79 countries, the impact 
of  IPR  on  innovative  performance  and  economic  growth,  finding  evidence  supporting  a 
positive relationship between IPR strength and economic growth rates however distinctive for 
the  different  levels  of  openness  in  international  trade,  less  relevant  in  trade  protected 
countries. Connolly (2003) has studied the impact of technology imports on innovation and 
imitation across 51 countries. The estimates presented corroborate the positive relationship of 
technology imports on both imitation and innovation. Overall, the impact of reinforcing IPR 
on innovation is positive however, given that innovation is proxied by patents these results 
might be biased. 
Also Schneider (2005) tries to assess the impact of IPR, high technology trade and FDI on 
innovation across developed and developing countries, considering high technology imports  
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as a concurring channel for technology transfer. In a sample of 47 countries, Schneider’s 
(2005)  estimates  reveal  a  significant  impact  of  high  technology  trade  on  innovation  and 
growth both in developed and developing countries, whereas the effect of IPR’s strengthening 
is positive, being significantly higher in developed countries. Nonetheless, as in Connolly’s 
(2003) study, innovation is again proxied by patents which may bias the estimators. Chen and 
Puttitanun  (2005)  also  evaluate  the  impact  of  IPR  in  economic  growth  in  developing 
countries, analyzing the trade-off between domestic innovation and imitation. In a quite novel 
fashion  these  authors  assess  the  net  potential  opposing  effects  of  imitation  and  domestic 
innovation instead of the usual balance between technology transfer and imitation. They argue 
that, despite usually being perceived that IPR will, in general, hurt developing countries (e.g. 
Helpman, 1993), IPR may actually have a positive, unaccounted for, effect over domestic 
innovation, which is usually disregarded in the North-South framework. Focussing on a South 
country, Léger (2005) studies the impact of IPR on the Mexican maize industry. He tries to 
evaluate, in a country that scores relatively well in IPR effectiveness, the relevance of IPR and 
its  effects  on  the  industry.  His  findings  show  that  IPR  had  no  impact  on  the  innovative 
performance of the industry, contradicting the common argument that IPR would stimulate 
innovation. Furthermore, Léger (2005) argues that in order for a patent/IPR instrument to be 
effective,  its  framework  should  be  adjusted  to  idiosyncrasies  of  different  stages  of 
development  implicitly  assuming  the  potential  for  asymmetric  effects  across  different 
development stages. Furukawa (2007) demonstrates, using a variety expansion model, that 
reinforcing  IPRs  have  different  effects  depending  on  the  openness  of  economies, 
corroborating Gould and Gruben’s (1996) results that stressed asymmetries of effects in terms 
of  a  country’s  trade  openness.  Furukawa’s  (2007)  modelling  indicates  that  for  closed 
economies, loosening IPRs may actually enhance growth.  
The question of which are the overall effects on the global economic growth rate and welfare 
from reinforcing South’s patent protection is the focus of Parello’s (2008) paper. He evaluates 
how IPR in the South affects R&D investment in the North and South, devising a model to 
analyse the different concurring effects. Overall, extending IPR coverage in South countries 
has  a  positive  effect  on  global  innovation  but  a  negative  on  technology  transfer  through 
imitation.  In  the  South,  at  a  micro  level,  one  observes  a  reduction  on  the  number  of 
researchers but a positive macro level effect taking into consideration externalities. Stating 
also that IPR may not be relevant to attract quality FDI, Parello (2008) falls short on not 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As reviewed in the present section and illustrated in Table 1, economic development literature 
has attributed a small amount of attention to the effects of IPR in technology transfer and 
innovation rates, failing to account its potential asymmetrical effects across different levels of 
development. Furthermore, although there are some studies that when analyzing the patent-
R&D relationship address the question of asymmetries (e.g. Helpman, 1993), the impact on 
the leaders (up-North) is rarely assessed. In other words, the amount of research done in this 
subject, usually focuses on the effects for the South countries or in a framework North-South, 
where the South is at the centre of the analysis, neglecting the net effects on North.  
It is, however, for North countries that the arguments of Shapiro (2001) and Hunt (2006) are 
more relevant. These authors have put forward a set of solid arguments that advice cautious in 
understanding the patent-R&D relationship in a linear, positive signaled way. In particular, 
Hunt’s  (2006)  argument  is  that  in  rapid  innovating  industries  such  as  semiconductors, 
innovation  is  a  strongly  path  dependent  process.  Making  patents  easier  to  obtain  and 
extending their protective range will contribute to the formation of a patent thicket where 
numerous intellectual property rights are entangled and through which innovative firms must 
cut through. In other words, if patent protection range is extensive then firms have to acquire 
several  licenses  and  bear  multiple  patent  burdens  (Shapiro,  2001),  thus  increasing  R&D 
investment’s costs. The simple proliferation of patents and building up of a patent thicket is 
conducive of an increase on innovation costs creating a negative incentive to R&D spending 
and limiting knowledge use and diffusion. Rather than stimulate R&D, the medicine (that is 
patents) might actually have a negative impact on R&D investment when technologies are 
overlapping and follow a cumulative path due to excessive restrictions to their usage. Heller 
and Eisenberg (1998) refer to this problem as the “tragedy of gatekeepers” in reference to the 
fact that excessive protection on the use of a particular resource, ultimately leads to its under 
use, resulting in a poorer dynamic economic performance. 
Although  Hunt  (2006)  follows  a  microeconomic  perspective,  his  intuition  can  easily  be 
extended to a macroeconomic perspective considering the economic specialization pattern, 
with  technological  leaders  presenting  a  high  share  of  knowledge  intensive  industries  and 
followers and laggards a more predominant pattern of low technology industries. In the North, 
the  argument  of  Hunt  (2006)  stresses  the  negative  impact  of  the  formation  of  the  patent 
thicket on its own R&D investment. In these countries, growth and innovative performance 
tends  to  rely  on  own  R&D  effort  and  clearly  less  on  imitation  (there  is  no  catching-up 
margin). Furthermore, high technology industries face a rapid rhythm of innovation and a  
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complexity level that enhances cumulativeness and path dependency. Thus, according to Hunt 
(2006)  the  expected  signal  of  the  relation  between  (accumulated)  patents  and  R&D 
investment would be negative. However, IPRs’ defenders would argue that the increase in 
returns through IPR extension to Southern countries and even in the North may compensate. 
Still, the creation of a ‘patent thicket’ seems a quite relevant aspect to be tested and to fit 
particularly  in  the  North  countries  whose  specialization  pattern  is  characterized  by  more 
knowledge intensive industries, increasingly aggregating different types of knowledge and 
presenting a fast innovative rhythm and cumulative technological progress. 
In  follower  countries, we find an acceptable level of capabilities that may  allow them to 
explore the fruits of imitation and potentially take full advantage of their catching-up margin. 
The case for strengthening IPRs net effect has to weight the growth and capability building 
importance of FDI, imitation and stimulus to domestic R&D as we presented in the previous 
section.  
Finally,  for  Least  Developed  Countries  (LDCs),  the  low  level  of  capabilities  and  human 
capital associated with the lack of scientific capabilities and infra-structures restricts severely 
the  possibility  for  imitation  (Maskus,  2000).  Additionally,  the  economic  structure 
characterized  by  low  technology  activities  and  exploitation  of  low-skilled  labor  cost 
advantages,  reduces  aspects  of  cumulativeness  and  rapid  technology  evolution.  As  Hunt 
(2006)  recognizes,  when  referring  the  low  technology  industries,  easing  patents  fosters 
innovation at no risk of forming a thicket. 
In the next section, we model Hunt’s (2006) argument in order to test for a sample of 95 
countries whether there is econometric evidence supporting asymmetries of impacts of patents 
on R&D investment across countries different levels of development and if these differences 
are significant in order to argue against the current “one size fits all” IPR system and in 
favour  of  a  more  “tailored” patent  system  in  accordance  to  countries  stages  of  economic 
development. 
3.  Testing  the  potential  asymmetric  impact  of  patent  on  R&D  across  countries’ 
development levels  
Assessing  the  impacts  of  patent  systems  and  Trade  Related  Intellectual  Property  Rights 
Agreements (TRIPs) on R&D is of utmost importance since R&D and innovation are the 
engine of economic growth. Existing empirical studies that bear an economic development 
perspective are rare and the few exceptions are focused on the South, overlooking the fact that  
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Northern technological leaders are an important part of the equation on global innovation 
dynamic performance.  
Intentionally taking the neglected North economic development perspective, in the present 
section we aim at empirically test whether there is enough evidence supporting asymmetric 
effects of patent systems on R&D investment across different stages of development. This 
enables us to analyze the adequacy of “one size fits all” patent system in opposition to the 
need of conceiving a more “tailored” solution.  
To model and test our hypothesis, we use Hunt’s (2006) argument and estimate, using panel 
data techniques, the effects of the patent thicket over R&D investment for a sample of 95 
(developed and developing) countries comprised over a 10 year period (1997 to 2006). For 
assessing  the  (potential  asymmetric)  effects  of  patents  on  R&D  across  we  propose  the 
following reduced model specification: 
it it it v AccumPat RD + + + = φX 1 δ θ  
Where i and t stands for, respectively the country and year indexes. 
RD stands for R&D expenditures in percentage of GDP and is our dependent variable which 
was  obtained  from  the  UN  Statistics  Division  online  database.  To  model  Hunt’s  patent 
thicket, we use USPTO data on patents granted per million of inhabitants and sum each year’s 
granted patents to the previous years’ accumulated sum starting in 1997. This gives us the 
accumulated patents for each country, proxying for the patent thicket. 
In  accordance  to  our  literature  review  (Section  2),  a  vector  X  is  added  to  the  model 
specification in order to control the estimation using variables proxying countries structural 
characteristics and governance performance.  
For structural characteristics we include FDI, High Technology Exports, Science Links, GDP 
per capita in Purchasing Power Parity and denominated in USD. FDI can be a determinant of 
R&D expenditures directly through MNE’s R&D location as well as acting as an (indirect) 
technology transfer channel.
2 The inclusion of High Technology Exports aims to reflect the 
specialization pattern of each country’s economic structure, namely, in terms of technology 
intensity.
3 Science links variable was constructed subtracting R&D executed by firms to R&D 
funded by firms, divided by total R&D expenditures. In the absence of quantitative measures 
                                                 
2 To proxy FDI, we use FDI inflows in percentage of Fixed Capital Formation, data retrieved from UN Statistics 
Division online database. 
3 This variable reports on the percentage of high technology imports in percentage of total manufactured exports 
and was also retrieved from UN Statistics Division.  
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of science links between firms and universities, our reasoning was that this difference would 
indicate whether or not R&D funded by enterprises exceeded their internal execution, thus 
indicating  whether  they  are  financing  other  entities  from  the  National  Scientific  System 
(Universities and Public R&D institutions), and thus linking to them. Thus, if the coefficient 
associated  to  this  variable  is  positive  it  would  mean  that  firms’  funding  exceed  their 
execution, and thus we infer that firms use Universities to obtain technology. Finally, despite 
one of the sampling methods uses income as a key variable, we include the log of GDP per 
capita in Purchasing Power Parity to account for potential differences among each group of 
countries in terms of income. 
To account for governance quality, we use law enforcement and political stability indicators 
retrieved from Kaufman et al. (2008). Law enforcement proxies the enforceability of patents 
whereas political stability is a determinant of long term investment decisions, thus highly 
likely to influence R&D investments.
4 
The assessment of the existence of asymmetric effects across countries different stages of 
development advices that we estimate the above-mentioned model for a set of countries sub-
samples. We use two decomposition methods. The first one is based on the fact that Hunt’s 
argument is essentially applied to technological leaders, that is, countries with relatively high 
innovative dynamics. Thus, we use RD and split up countries using a threshold of 2.5%, with 
countries  with  RD>2,5%  standing  as  the  technology  frontier  ones.  The  two  resulting 
subsamples, one with 10 countries, comprising the technology frontier countries, which have 
a very high investment in R&D, and the other remaining 85 countries, which R&D intensity is 
below 2,5%. However, testing asymmetries according to the levels of development advices 
that we also use a more stratified framework based on GDP. This leads to our second splitting 
method. Using World Bank’s Atlas method, countries are split according to their level of per 
capita  GDP  in  comparison  to  a  set  of  thresholds.  Here  we  obtained  four  subsamples 
separating low, medium-low, medium-high and high income per capita countries.  
The next table provides a brief statistical summary regarding each of the variables used in our 
estimation.  
 
                                                 
4 These indicators are defined in an interval of -2,5 to 2,5. In order to ease the interpretation of coefficients we 
use added 2,5 to every observation so that the interval is now defined between 0 and 5.
 Kaufman et al. (2008) 
present cases where the minimum or the maximum is actually outside the predefined values, fact that justifies 
why after adding 2.5, negative values are still present in the data.  
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4. Cross country evidence on the asymmetric impact of patent systems 
Somewhat surprising results arise from the empirical analysis which is summarized in Table 
2.  In  general,  the  results  support  the  existence  of  differentiated  impact  of  patents  across 
countries.  
When considering the threshold of 2,5% expenditures in R&D, we observe a negative and 
significant effect of the proxy for the patent thicket on R&D investment, which corroborates 
Hunt’s argument. Although the countries which are included in the group below the 2,5% 
threshold are quite heterogeneous, on the overall, this group presents a significant positive 
relationship of (accumulated) patent on R&D investment. This would be expectable from 
Hunt’s argument since patent thickets are more relevant for countries with a very high R&D 
intensity.  
Analysing  the  results  obtained  using  the  disaggregation  of  countries  based  on  the  Atlas 
Method, we find evidence that not only supports the asymmetric effects of patents on R&D 
investment across different stages of countries development levels but also provides evidence 
of a pattern of asymmetries that is not linear along the “development ladder”. High income 
countries  sample  (31  countries)  lead  to  a  non  significant  estimate  probably  due  to 
heterogeneity  in  the  group.  In  fact,  we  find  asymmetries  not  only  regarding  the  elite  of 
R&D>2,5%, but also on different levels of development,
5 namely obtaining a negative and 
significant sign in medium-low income countries. In contrast, a positive effect of patents on 
R&D investment is found on low income level and medium-high income level countries. 
The  positive  signal  on  medium-high  income  countries  tends  to  reflect  the  relevance  of 
domestic R&D and innovative activities on the capabilities of signalling by these countries 
whereas for low income countries the predominance of low technology intensive industries 
actually benefit from easing the granting of patents and thus stimulating R&D. The negative 
signal in medium-low income countries is more surprising revealing that perhaps for these 
countries accessing to knowledge and imitation is more relevant than domestic R&D or that 
the patent thicket creates a higher cost of entry in innovation which firms still far from the 
frontier have difficulties to bear. 
Apart  from  the  case  of  medium-high  income  countries  FDI  emerges  not  statistically 
significant as an R&D determinant. In fact, the impact is even negative suggesting that FDI 
                                                 
5  In  addition  to  these  two  disaggregation  methods,  we  also  tested  the  model  using  Castelacci’s  (2006) 
technological convergence clubs and also simpler  model  specifications. The estimates corroborate the  main 
results obtained and presented here and certify the robustness of our results.   
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may replace the need for domestic R&D as a concurrent channel for capability building or, in 
a worst case scenario, act like in the natural resources curse.  
High technology exports are overall not significant throughout different levels of economic 
development  with  the  exception  of  R&D<=2,5%  where  the  heterogeneity  of  included 
countries  is  such  that  this  variable  contributes  in  a  barely  significant  way  to  distinguish 
countries structural characteristics.  
Science  linkages  are  crucial  to  increase  R&D  cost  efficiency  as  well  as  stimulating  the 
economy through Universities research results. Our econometric results allow to infer that 
science linkages are relevant to R&D bearing an effect several times higher, in absolute value, 
on high income and above the 2,5% threshold in comparison to lower income levels or less 
R&D  intensive  countries.  The  direction  of  effect  is  nevertheless  common  and  negative 
indicating that the execution of R&D by firms is a strong determinant of R&D investment and 
the  relevance  of  firms  in  participating  is  higher  in  developed  countries.  Being  that  the 
execution  of  R&D  by  firms  emerged  as  a  major  determinant  of  R&D  investment,  this 
indicates that public policy may need to redirect from a science push perspective towards a 
more demand pull approach, bridging public R&D to the economy. 
GDP per capita (logGDP) captures relevant information in terms of determinants of R&D 
investment  being  overall  significant  at  1%.  The  effects  on  the  first  two  sub  samples  are 
positive  with  a  higher  absolute  impact  on  technological  leaders.  Using  the  Atlas  method, 
results are still significant but more at odds. There arises a negative impact of GDP upon 
R&D investment on low and high income countries. If on the former case the explanation 
may lay on the heterogeneity of the sub sample, for high income levels the particular cases of 
oil producing countries characterized by high income levels but low R&D commitment may 
explain these distortions.  
Finally,  governance  indicators  appear  only  to  be  relevant  for  technological  leaders 
(RD>2,5%),  both  presenting  a  negative  signal.  Nevertheless,  among  these  countries  the 
performance  levels  in  terms  of  governance  are  generally  very  high  and  small  differences 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The  main  goal  of  the  present  paper  was  to  assess  the  patent-R&D  relationship  from  an 
economic development standpoint, seeking to bring at the forefront of the analysis the effect 
of (accumulated) patents on R&D Investment not only on South countries or North-South 
framework but above all re-directing the analysis towards a rather overlooked perspective, 
that of the North. In particular, we aimed at empirically explore the hypothesis of asymmetric 
impacts  of  patents  on  R&D  investment  across  different  stages  of  countries  economic 
development and provide insights on fostering R&D investment.  
The econometric modeling followed an extension of Hunt’s (2006) microeconomic argument 
to a macroeconomic perspective, using the patent thicket as the main independent variable. 
Using panel data estimation techniques for a sample of 95 countries over a ten years period, 
we estimate the effects of patent thicket formation on R&D investment controlling for the 
country’s stage of development.  
Our results support the hypothesis of asymmetric effects for different stages of development, 
bearing a negative impact on R&D strongly committed countries (that is, those that present a 
R&D intensity above 2,5%) as well as on medium low income countries, whereas for medium 
high and low income countries the effect is significant and positive. Hence, we find evidence 
that  support  asymmetric  impacts  that  do  even  change  signal  along  the  climbing  of  the 
“development ladder”.  
In the light of these results we ought to argue against the “one size fits all” approach to IPRs, 
concluding that a more flexible patent system that changed the protective range of patents 
across stages of development would be more R&D supportive and also lead to a superior 
innovative performance.  
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￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿3! ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ >  ￿"! ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
) ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ? ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
@ , ￿ A 4 ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿  ￿B￿ ￿ ￿ C￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿
3￿ ￿ - ￿￿"! ￿￿ ! ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ !￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿=  , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿’￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ / ￿
D ￿ E  ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿* ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿+ # ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ 5 ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿"￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿# ￿ ￿ ( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿# ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿"￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ 6￿
7 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ! ￿7 ￿￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ # ￿- ￿# ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿5 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿# 2 !￿￿"￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ 9 ￿
7 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿"! ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ F ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! G ! ￿G ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ) ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿- ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿"￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ ; ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿@ , ￿ A 4 ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿  ￿B￿ ￿ ￿ C￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿
#￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿=  , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ’) # ’￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ # ’￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# !￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ! ￿7 ￿￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿+ # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ , ￿￿￿) ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ !￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿
7 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿$￿￿ ￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿9 ￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿# ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿: ; < : ￿￿￿￿: ; < = !￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿
3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿H ￿￿ 4 I  +￿ ￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ) ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ !￿￿"￿ ￿ , ’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿"￿ ￿ , ’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 / ￿
￿ ￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿. ￿ ( ￿ ￿￿￿> ￿￿1 # ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿!￿￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿5 5 ￿
￿ ￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿- ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿’- ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ # !￿￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 6￿
J ￿ 4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$￿# ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ " ￿￿- ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
* ￿￿￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿) ￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿!￿￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 9 ￿
3￿ ￿ - ￿￿"! ￿￿ ! ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3￿  I ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ F ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ; ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ , ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿  , ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿?￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿) ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿5 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ @ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ , ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿  , ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿?+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿A & ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ B ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ , ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ , ￿  , ￿ ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿?￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ C ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿A & ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿A & ￿￿￿￿￿D ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿A & ￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿
3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿?￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿6￿￿
#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ , ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿* ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿2 !￿￿2 ￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿6￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿@ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ￿ , ’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿#￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’ ￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ !￿￿2 ￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿6/ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿ ￿ ￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ! ￿7 ￿￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿" ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿6 ￿￿ ￿) ￿ ) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿@ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿2 ￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿65 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ! ￿7 ￿￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿E￿ ￿# ￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿ ￿ 2 !￿￿2 ￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿66￿
￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿ ! ￿7 ￿￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿* F ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿!￿￿2 ￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿69 ￿
￿ ￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿, ￿$￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿* F ￿2 !￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿6; ￿
< ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?$￿# ￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿2 ￿
1 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿4 ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿@ # ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿!￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿6￿￿
"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿  ￿"￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿￿?￿￿￿B ￿￿￿￿￿￿ G ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿B ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿H : ; ; ; ’I J J < K 2 !￿￿￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿6￿￿ ￿ ￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿  ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿# ￿- ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿# , ￿￿ ￿* ￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿￿@ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿6￿ ￿
3￿ ￿ - ￿￿"! ￿￿ ! ￿0 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿?￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿@ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿
7 ! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿< ! ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿0 ! ￿1 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ! ￿0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿"! ￿0 ￿ ￿- ￿  ￿￿@ ! ￿ & ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ! ￿
0 ￿  , ￿ ￿ , ￿￿ ￿  ￿￿?7 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿￿+ - ’￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ !￿￿@ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ￿ ￿
"A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿8 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿"! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿?￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿￿> ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿4 ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ , ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ !￿￿@ , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿9 / ￿
@ , ￿ A 4 ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿ - ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿< ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿  ￿B￿ ￿ ￿ C￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ( ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+ ￿￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿) ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿9 5 ￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿"! ￿"! ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ >  ￿￿ ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿ ! ￿￿ ! ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?* ￿￿￿ ￿4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿# ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿9 6￿
) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿ ! ￿￿ ! ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿"! ￿"! ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?4 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿L ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿9 9 ￿
#￿ ￿ ￿H ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 4 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿=  , ￿ ￿ ￿￿ & ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿?￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ , ￿
1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$￿2 !￿￿3￿ ￿ : ￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
￿￿￿￿9 ; ￿
2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿"! ￿"! ￿) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿?￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
+ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿￿ ￿￿" ￿!￿￿3￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ / ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
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